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A B S T R A C T
This article analyses the effect of conflict in the Council of
the European Union (EU) on delays in the transposition of
EU directives. Based on enforcement and management
theories, we predict that conflict in the Council speeds up
the transposition process. In addition, we control for the
instigation of infringement procedures by the Commission
and expect a weaker effect of conflict in cases where the
Commission disagrees with a directive and if directives grant
more discretion to member states. These hypotheses are
tested using two indicators of conflict: heterogeneity and
polarization. Cox regression analysis is applied with time-
dependent effects and with a shared frailty to control for the
multilevel structure of the data. The analyses show that, over
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Introduction
The implementation process in the European Union (EU) could be defined as
the transmission of legislation adopted at the EU level into the actions of
member states (Mastenbroek, 2007). In the first stage of implementation,
member states are obliged to incorporate the EU law into their national legis-
lation before a specified deadline; a process that is referred to as transposition.
If a member state fails to meet the deadline, the delay in transposition is
interpreted as a deviation from the EU law (Mastenbroek, 2003; Steunenberg,
2006; Thomson et al., 2007).
Most EU scholars focus on factors at the national level to explain member
states’ non-compliance with EU laws. Studies report evidence that delays in
transposition are caused by constraints within member states, such as govern-
ment and administrative inefficiency (see Haverland and Romeijn, 2007;
Mbaye, 2001, for infringement procedures), a mismatch between existing
domestic legislation and an EU law (Héritier, 1996; Duina, 1997) or the
presence of domestic veto players (Steunenberg, 2006). Other studies focus
on the characteristics of EU legislation and show that short deadlines and high
levels of discretion granted to national authorities lead to longer delays
(Kaeding, 2006, 2008; Thomson et al., 2007). However, most studies focus on
characteristics of the adopted policy decision and disregard characteristics of
decision-making, such as the level of conflict in the Council of the EU.
The present study aims to account for ‘the missing link’ between conflict
in decision-making and implementation by making four contributions to the
study on delays in the transposition of EU directives. First, we introduce 
the level of conflict between member states in the Council of the EU as a
characteristic of decision-making that affects delays in transposition. Based
on the literature dealing with enforcement and management in the EU, we
predict that conflict in the Council speeds up the transposition process, which
contradicts the predictions of standard implementation theories. In addition,
we predict that (1) this positive effect of conflict is mediated by the insti-
gation of infringement procedures by the Commission against member states,
and (2) the effect of conflict is dependent upon (a) the level of disagreement
of the Commission with a policy and (b) the level of discretion granted to
member states. Thus, our predictions are informed by the specific institutional
context of decision-making and transposition.
The second contribution of this study is the specific operationalization of
conflict in the Council. In this study, we use a data set on ‘Decision making
in the European Union’ (hereafter DEU), which provides information on 
the policy preferences of 15 member states in relation to 23 directives. Thus,
we are able to measure conflict directly in terms of differences in policy
European Union Politics 10(1)3 6
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preferences. The few studies that explicitly test the effect of conflict in the
Council on discretion or delays in transposition either use imperfect proxies
of conflict such as voting rules (Franchino, 2004), or derive estimates of
member states’ policy preferences based on party positions in election mani-
festos (König, 2001; König et al., 2005; Franchino, 2007). The only exception
is the study by Thomson and Torenvlied (2007), who also measure conflict
directly. However, they apply it to the study of discretion and not trans-
position. In addition, our study employs two different measures of sub-
stantive preference-based conflict in the Council: heterogeneity and policy
polarization.
The third contribution of this research is related to the method of analysis.
Most studies on transposition disregard the multilevel structure of trans-
position data, when: (1) different member states are transposing the same
directives, and (2) different directives are being transposed by the same
member state. Neglecting the nested structure of transposition data produces
unreliable estimates, because observations are not independent. By contrast,
we introduce shared frailty models in our statistical analyses to account for the
nested structure of the data.
Finally, we test how the effects of our independent variables change over
time. Thus, we arrive at a more precise interpretation of the estimates of the
time-dependent terms. Advanced techniques to interpret time-interacted
variables have only recently been applied to EU decision-making by Golub
and Steunenberg (2007). We apply these techniques to the study on trans-
position delay.
Theory
Theories of policy implementation study the problem of compliance by
employing simplified assumptions about the underlying mechanisms that
explain variation between implementers and policy issues in compliance with
policy objectives (Torenvlied, 2000). It is assumed that a difference in most
preferred policies between legislators and implementers is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of non-compliance (Pressman and Wildavsky,
1973). Spatial models of policy implementation and political control of
bureaucracy map these most preferred policies in one or more issue dimen-
sions as policy positions. Each legislator is assumed to strive for a collective
decision outcome as close as possible to her own policy position. She does so
under restrictions, such as relative bargaining power and access to insti-
tutional resources (Thomson et al., 2006). Each implementer is assumed to
strive for a policy performance as close as possible to her own policy position.
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 3 7
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The distance between the policy position of an implementer and the decision
outcome is an indicator of the implementer’s incentive to deviate. Implementers
choose to deviate under restrictions, such as their expected reputational loss
and expected costs from policy deviations (Torenvlied, 2000). The application
of different ex ante and ex post instruments for monitoring and penalizing
policy deviations by ‘oversight committees’ affects the likelihood of costs and
reputation loss by the implementer (McCubbins et al., 1987, 1989).
Conflict among legislators
The problem of compliance is intensified if we take into account the level of
support for decision outcomes by legislators. If policy positions between legis-
lators differ strongly – as an indicator of conflict – there is little agreement
among legislators on the proper course of action. In various ways, theories
of policy implementation incorporate the effect of conflict. First, decision
outcomes reached under conflict are more likely to reflect (watered down)
compromises. A collective outcome based on highly diverging positions will
be potentially ambiguous and incoherent, which will constrain the efficiency
of implementers (Hill and Hupe, 2002) and exacerbate the compliance
problem (Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992). Secondly, decision outcomes reached
under conflict grant ‘preference-induced discretion’ to implementers, who are
able to exploit disagreement between different majority coalitions in the
legislature (McCubbins et al., 1987, 1989). Thirdly, deviations from decision
outcomes reached under conflict are likely to be (tacitly) approved of by some
legislators, thus reducing the costs of reputational loss associated with the
policy deviation (Torenvlied, 2000). On the basis of these mechanisms,
implementation theory predicts that legislative conflict negatively affects
compliance.
In EU policy-making, member states are the legislators in the Council of
the EU, but they are also responsible for implementing the EU policies 
within their national contexts (Falkner et al., 2005; Franchino, 2007; Thomson
et al., 2007). The mechanisms that explain non-compliance, as specified by
implementation theory, are also observed in the EU context. For example, if
member states have widely divergent policy positions, they are likely to have
an incentive to deviate during the implementation stage (dubbed ‘opposition
through the back door’ by Falkner et al., 2004). Consequently, we would
expect longer delays for EU policies that were more contested in the Council
(Falkner et al., 2004; König et al., 2005). However, this effect of conflict in the
Council would be explained when controlling for member states’ incentives
to deviate. Furthermore, two recent studies find a positive effect of incentives
European Union Politics 10(1)3 8
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for deviation on the timeliness of transposition (König et al., 2005; Thomson
et al., 2007).
The role of the Commission
EU policy-making combines intergovernmental decision-making in the
Council with supranational policy preparation and oversight by the
Commission. The Commission has extensive powers to monitor member state
compliance with EU laws, to issue warnings to member state governments
with a questionable implementation record, and to pursue formal infringe-
ment procedures before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in cases of
persistent non-compliance. The Commission even has the power to propose
punitive fines to be issued against member states that violate EU law before
the ECJ (Pollack, 2003: 86). Thus, there are strong parallels between the
Commission in the context of EU policy-making and ‘oversight committees’
in the US Congressional setting.
The present article focuses on directives as a type of EU law. Directives
leave open the choice for national governments of how to transpose their
content into their own legislation. Nevertheless, directives bind member
states in the sense that national governments are required to inform the
Commission before a specified deadline about the measures they took in
transposing an EU directive. In addition, the Commission has the power to
monitor and evaluate the transposition process by means of its own research
and initiative. For instance, the Commission can oversee the transposition
process through national or European parliamentary questions and petitions.
In addition, the Commission responds to member state non-compliance in
reaction to complaints from citizens, civil society, enterprises and other
member states that consider their rights to be violated according to an EU
law (From and Stava, 1993: 63).
Council conflict and Commission oversight
Member states do not exclusively act upon their own interests. They also care
about the transposition of an EU policy in all member states because unequal
practices lead to negative externalities (Majone, 2001), which defeat the
purpose of adopting an EU law (Franchino, 2007). Thus, member states 
could commit to the transposition of a directive if the expected costs of non-
compliance outweigh the benefits of postponing the implementation process.
In addition, conflict in the Council of the EU could signal imminent problems
in transposition or national application to the Commission. In his study of
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 3 9
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EU compliance, Tallberg (2003) argues that the combination of rule enforce-
ment by independent agents and the management of potential problems
induces rule-conforming behaviour by member states. Enforcement is necess-
ary when member states are not willing to bear the costs of transposing direc-
tives that are incompatible with national arrangements. We expect that more
controversial directives are more likely to be enforced by the Commission
(Tallberg, 2003; König et al., 2005) through increased oversight and a credible
threat of sanctions. Management is necessary when member states are not able
to solve problems because of differences in established policy practices, which
lead to delays in transposition (Mbaye, 2001; Tallberg, 2003). We expect that
more controversial directives are more likely to be subject to informal bargain-
ing through management and dispute settlement strategies (Elgström and
Jönsson, 2000). Because both enforcement and management are assumed to
speed up the transposition process, we arrive at the following hypothesis:
H1: Conflict in the Council speeds up the transposition of EU directives.
The enforcement perspective shows that increased rigor in the
Commission’s monitoring is reflected by infringement procedures (Tallberg,
2003). Member states are expected to transpose faster after the instigation of
an infringement procedure. We indeed observe a widening of the gap between
the first legal step in the infringement procedure (the number of ‘letters of
formal notice’) and subsequent steps – often referred to as an indicator of
rigorous monitoring by the Commission (Mendrinou, 1996: 16). The manage-
ment perspective also embraces infringement procedures: the first EU infringe-
ment procedures (Article 226 of the EC Treaty) are interpreted in terms of a
managerial dialogue between the Commission and the accused member state
(Börzel et al., 2005). Thus, the Commission is expected to affect the trans-
position process directly by instigating legal procedures against violators of
the EU law. These procedures impose costs on further delays in transposition
and help member states communicate problems – resulting in a faster
transposition of EU law.
H2a: Member states will speed up the transposition of an EU directive after receiv-
ing a letter of formal notice with respect to their performance on this directive.
If the Commission responds to conflict in the Council and interprets it as
a signal of potential non-compliance problems, we expect more monitoring
and infringement procedures for controversial directives. Thus, we expect
that the instigation of infringement procedures (i.e. letters of formal notice)
mediates the relation between conflict and timely transposition.
H2b: Controlling for the instigation of an infringement procedure, the positive
effect of conflict in the Council on the timeliness of transposition decreases.
European Union Politics 10(1)4 0
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Conditions for enforcement and management
The enforcement and management of EU legislation by the Commission come
at a price and are highly sensitive to the limited resources available to the
Commission (Jensen, 2007). For example, monitoring is a time-consuming
process that requires the mobilization of different sources of information. Thus,
the two perspectives disregard the scope conditions under which conflict in the
Council induces the Commission to prevent or respond to non-compliant
behaviour by member states. Although conflict in the Council signals which
directives are prone to potential transposition problems, specific Commission
characteristics could moderate this relation (Börzel, 2001; Tallberg and Jönsson,
2001). Thus, implementation problems might arise because enforcing agents’
policy priorities often diverge from the goals of decision-makers (Pressman
and Wildavsky, 1973). This finding has been corroborated in studies on the
implementation of EU policies by member states (Héritier et al., 1996; Falkner
et al., 2005). In this study we apply this perspective to the Commission as an
enforcement agent (Tallberg, 2003). Thus, a first scope condition for investment
in enforcement and management is the Commission’s level of disagreement
with the outcome of decision-making. The Commission is expected to put less
effort into the enforcement and management of controversial directives that
are further away from its own policy preferences. Thus, we expect a negative
interaction effect between conflict in the Council and disagreement by the
Commission of the timeliness of transposition.
H3: The positive effect of conflict in the Council on the timeliness of trans-
position is weaker, the more the Commission disagrees with an EU policy.
A second scope condition for effective enforcement and management by
the Commission is the level of discretion granted to member states in a direc-
tive. The delegation literature shows that discretion is closely related to
incomplete contracting and a lack of precision in the adopted policies
(Franchino, 2007). Based on the management approach, directives that grant
discretionary powers to member states are ambiguous and incoherent in their
policy objectives (Chayes and Chayes, 1993).1 Thus, discretion granted to
member states creates non-compliance problems because states are uncertain
about the behavioural requirements of an EU law. Since highly ambiguous
directives also limit the capacity of the Commission to respond effectively to
member state non-compliance (Börzel et al., 2005), we expect a negative inter-
action effect between conflict in the Council and the level of discretion granted
to member states on the timeliness of transposition.
H4: The positive effect of conflict in the Council on the timeliness of transposition
is weaker, the more discretion is granted to member states in the transposition
process.
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 4 1
 at University of Groningen on January 19, 2011eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Research design
We tested our hypotheses using data on 23 directives that were compiled by
Thomson et al. (2007).2 The 23 directives cover a variety of policy areas: 
the internal market (eight directives), economic and financial affairs (five
directives), agriculture (three directives), transport (three directives), justice
and home affairs (one directive), employment (one directive), energy (one
directive) and health (one directive).
The data set is based on several sources. First, information on delays in
transposition was obtained from the EU databases EUR-lex and CELEX
(Thomson et al., 2007). We searched for records and documents of national
legislation to complement the data on the transposition records of member
states and update the data set.3 Data on the policy positions of the
Commission and the 15 member states were provided by the DEU data set
(Thomson et al., 2006). The selection of proposals in the DEU data set was
based on three criteria. First, the selected proposals had to be subject to either
the codecision or the consultation procedure, and the procedure should not
have been changed after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999.
Second, the selected proposals had to be discussed in the Council meetings
between 1998 and 2001. Third, all selected proposals had to contain at least
one controversial issue. A random sample would have led to the inclusion of
issues with only marginal, technical importance, where member states 
would have taken similar positions (Thomson and Stokman, 2003; Thomson
et al., 2007).
Dependent variable: Transposition delay
The dependent variable in this study, delays in transposition, is measured as
the length of delay in weeks from the deadline until the date of the earliest
reported transposition measure by each member state (Thomson et al., 2007).4
Because information is available on 15 member states transposing 23 direc-
tives, we obtain 345 potential cases of transposition. In 129 cases, the member
state had already transposed the directive before the deadline expired, so for
these cases delay is 0 weeks. By the end of the present study, after extensive
search, we were not able to obtain transposition reports for 49 cases. For 
these censored cases the length of delay is calculated as the number of 
weeks between the expiration date of the deadline to the end of the study 
(12 February 2007). Two cases were not relevant because one of the directives
on economic and financial affairs did not apply to France, and because the
Justice and Home Affairs directive includes an exemption for Denmark. Thus,
we have 343 cases available for the analysis on delays in transposition. 
Table 1 provides information on the major variables in the analysis.
European Union Politics 10(1)4 2
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Conflict: Heterogeneity and polarization
This study employs two indicators of conflict: heterogeneity and policy polar-
ization. The selection of these two conflict indicators is based on the fact that
heterogeneity and policy polarization stress different properties of conflict.
Heterogeneity stresses alienation between member states in terms of their
policy positions, and is measured by the standard deviation in member state
policy positions. Under qualified majority voting (QMV), larger member
states count more than smaller ones, since they are allotted more votes (Cini,
2003). Therefore, we weighted member state positions by their capabilities 
on the basis of their Shapley Shubik Index (SSI) score – thus incorporating
the effect of the decision rule (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Thomson and 
Stokman, 2003).
Policy polarization stresses both alienation between and identification
within groups of member states: internally homogeneous groups might be
highly antagonistic towards each other even if their level of alienation is
moderate. A polarization measure is based on the index developed by Esteban
and Ray (1994).5 Alienation is measured by taking the absolute distance
between groups of member states that share a different policy position.
Identification is a function of the relative group size π, and a ‘polarization
sensitivity’ parameter α, which is bounded between 0 and 1.6 to differentiate
polarization from inequality (see Esteban and Ray, 1994). In the present study,
α is set to 1.6. For the computation of relative group size π, we differentiated
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis based on transposition
cases
N Mean Minimum Maximum S.d.
Dependent variable
Delay in transposition 343 75.80 0.00 424.14 127.58
Independent variables
Directive level
Heterogeneity 343 38.23 16.06 50.03 10.97
Policy polarization 343 10.46 3.06 16.57 5.32
Commission disagreement 343 37.24 0.00 75.00 22.79
Discretion 343 18.21 0.00 50.00 14.62
Member state level
Member state incentive 337 45.37 0.00 100.00 34.06
Member state distance from 
Commission 337 33.96 0.00 100.00 33.00
Formal notice (time-varying 
covariate) 343 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.47
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between directives decided under unanimity and those decided under QMV.
For unanimity, we computed π as the proportion of member states support-
ing the same policy position relative to the total number of member states.
For QMV, we computed π for each group as the aggregated member state SSI
score (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Thomson and Stokman, 2003).
The policy positions of member states were measured by Thomson et al.
(2006) on the basis of interviews with key informants (see Thomson et al.,
2006, and Thomson et al., 2007, for a full discussion and illustration of the
construction of issue scales). Because issues are nested within proposals, we
followed Thomson et al. (2007) by taking the maximum issue value of the
conflict measures as the directive-level measure, thus assuming that the 
most debated issue gives rise to disagreement associated with the whole
directive.
Figure 1 illustrates the empirical relation between the two conflict indi-
cators in the data set. The major observation from Figure 1 is that heterogene-
ity and policy polarization are highly correlated. The most polarized
directives are also the most heterogeneous ones. However, there exists more
variation in heterogeneity for lower values of policy polarization. A more
detailed look at the data uncovers the driving force behind this result: the
most conflictive directives are those for which member states are equally
distributed into two opposing policy groups. By contrast, directives with three
or more policy groups supporting different policy positions reflect lower
levels of polarization but still relatively high levels of heterogeneity.
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Figure 1 Heterogeneity and policy polarization for 23 directives.
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Other independent variables
Infringement procedures were identified by reviewing the Annual Report of
the Application of Community Law for each of the years between 1999 and 2006.
The initiation of an infringement procedure against a member state is
measured by a dummy variable (formal notice = 1). Since, in principle, letters
of formal notice should have been sent to all delayed cases in the analyses,
we introduce a time-varying covariate (a variable that changes values over
time), which takes the value of 1 when a member state transposes a directive
after receiving a formal notice.
Commission disagreement with the outcome is measured at the level of the
directive as the average distance between the Commission’s position on 
an issue and a policy outcome. Discretion is computed by dividing the
number of provisions granting powers to member states by the total number
of provisions in a directive (i.e. the discretion ratio) (Franchino, 2004;
Thomson et al., 2007). In addition, we controlled for a member state’s 
incentive to deviate, which is measured as the absolute distance between the
policy position of a member state and the decision outcome. We took the
maximal value of the member state incentive on the issues (Thomson et al.,
2007). We also controlled for a member state’s disagreement with the
Commission, which is measured by taking the absolute value of the distance
between a member state’s policy position and the policy position supported
by the Commission.
Design of the analyses
Because we test hypotheses on the timing of transposition, we applied Cox
regression analysis. Cox regression is an event-history modelling technique
(also known as survival analysis) that allows us to study the probability that
a particular directive will be transposed in any given week provided that it
has not yet been transposed. Furthermore, the Cox model is especially useful
since it allows us to estimate the effects of our independent variables on
member states’ transposition without having to assume a specific parametric
form for the distribution of time until an event occurs (Cleves et al., 2002;
Golub, 2007). In addition, this model easily allows for the inclusion of
‘censored’ cases (Mastenbroek, 2003; Thomson et al., 2007). These are the cases
in which no transposition measure was reported before the end of the study
(49 cases in this analysis). We included two recent methodological advances
in survival analysis to our study: (a) we controlled for the multilevel struc-
ture in the data, and (b) we specified time-dependent effects.
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 4 5
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Shared frailty models
In this study, we applied a Cox regression model with a shared frailty factor to
accommodate the multilevel structure of our data. Frailty models are the
survival data analogy to regression models that account for heterogeneity and
random effects. Shared frailty models account for the dependency between
clustered events by introducing a ‘cluster-specific random effect’ – the frailty
– which is common for the whole cluster. In this research, member states are
‘clustered’ within directives and thus shared frailty models allow us to control
for unobserved random effects at the level of the directive. These unobserved
effects are tested using a variance component theta (θ ) and a likelihood ratio
test for the hypothesis that this variance is zero. A shared frailty factor with
zero variance implies that the events of transposition by member states are
not affected by the fact that 15 member states are transposing the same 23
directives. By contrast, a significant variance component of the shared frailty
factor indicates that member states’ transposition times are affected by un-
observed directive-level characteristics (Wienke, 2003; Cleves et al., 2002).
The nested structure of the data is even more complex: the different
directives are also transposed by the same 15 member states. In other words,
there could be unobserved random effects at the member state level.
However, Cox regression does not allow us to fit two shared frailty models
at the same time. Instead, we computed 15 country dummies and tested
whether member states significantly differ in transposition performance. If
member states transpose the directives based on country-level unobserved
characteristics, we should see significant differences between member states.
Figure 2 illustrates the average length of delay for each of the 15 member
states. Although we observe some differences between the member states’
average transposition performance, the test of parameters for the country
dummies showed that these differences are not significant (χ2 (14) = 11.10,
p = .678).6 Thus, in the following analyses we account only for the shared
frailty at the level of directives.
The proportionality assumption and time-dependent variables
An important characteristic of the Cox model is the assumption that the effects
are proportional over the different values of the independent variables. In
essence, this implies that the effects of independent variables are constant
over time. This consideration is important because estimation of proportional
hazards models with non-proportional effects can result in biased estimates
and flawed inferences about the substantive impact of relevant independent
variables (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Golub, 2007; Golub and
European Union Politics 10(1)4 6
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Steunenberg, 2007). Thus, the proportionality assumption should be checked
for all independent variables before any conclusions can be drawn about the
effect of conflict on delays in transposition.
In this study, we apply the Grambsch and Therneau test for proportion-
ality, the most widely accepted test. Those variables for which the test reports
non-proportional effects should be interacted with a function (usually ln(t))
of survival time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001).
Table 2 presents the results of the Grambsch and Therneau test. The table
reveals that we should reject the null hypothesis of proportionality (p < .05)
for most of the variables in the analysis. The proportionality assumption is
met for only three of the variables in the model with heterogeneity as a conflict
indicator (i.e. member state’s incentives for deviation, member state distance
from the Commission, and the interaction between heterogeneity and the
Commission’s disagreement with a directive). In the model with polarization,
only member state’s incentives for deviation and member state distance from
the Commission have proportional effects on the dependent variable. There-
fore, the appropriate model specification will include Cox models that
account for changes in the time-dependent effects.
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Figure 2 Average delays of the 15 member states transposing the 23 directives.
Note: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EL = Greece, ES = Spain, 
FI = Finland, FR = France, IR = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = the Netherlands, 
PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. 
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Results
Conflict and delays in transposing EU directives
Before specifying the models, it is important to remark that the coefficients
estimate the change in the hazard that a directive will be transposed in a
particular week owing to one unit of change on the independent variable.
Thus, a positive sign on the coefficient refers to an increase in the hazard ratio
of transposition owing to an increase in the relevant independent variable. A
negative sign refers to a decrease in the transposition rate. One minus the
exponent of each coefficient represents the proportional change in the hazard
rate based on a one-unit increase in the value of the relevant independent
variable. Note that the tables present coefficients, whereas in the text we
discuss hazard ratios.
Table 3 reports the estimates of three models testing the effect of conflict
on delays in the transposition of 23 EU directives. Because heterogeneity and
polarization are highly correlated, their effects are reported separately.
Furthermore, we include the test for significance of the shared frailty variance
to detect whether the multilevel structure of the data matters. As Table 3
shows, the variance of the shared frailty factor (θ ) is significantly larger than
0 in all models. This result implies that the transposition times by member
states are significantly correlated when they are transposing the same
European Union Politics 10(1)4 8
Table 2 Grambsch and Therneau test for the proportionality assumption
Polarization Heterogeneity
———————————— ——————————–—
rho χ2 p-value rho χ2 p-value
Directive level
Conflict .216 96.88 .000 .169 51.14 .000
Commission disagreement –.129 33.95 .000 –.159 51.22 .000
Conflict * Commission 
disagreement .068 9.35 .002 .030 1.62 .204
Conflict * Discretion –.109 25.13 .000 –.075 10.96 .001
Discretion .110 24.56 .000 .077 11.53 .001
Member state level
Member state incentive –.070 1.71 .191 –.030 0.31 .575
Member state distance from 
Commission .035 0.43 .513 .006 0.01 .907
Formal notice (time-varying 
covariate) .264 28.08 .000 .270 29.53 .000
Global test – 192.45 .000 – 127.04 .000
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directive. Thus, the hazard ratios should be interpreted conditional on the
shared frailty (that is, the directive-specific random effects).
For each model we first discuss the model specification and subsequently
the substantive results. The Preference Model tests Hypothesis 1 that conflict
in the Council speeds up the transposition of EU directives. The Preference
Model also controls for the member states’ incentives for deviation, the
Commission’s disagreement with a directive, the discretion ratio and member
state distance from the Commission. Additionally, all variables for which the
proportionality assumption is not met are interacted with ln(time) to correct
for their non-proportional effects on delays in transposition.7
The results of the Preference Model show that conflict does not initially
affect the timeliness of transposition, but that its effect turns significant and
positive over time. Both heterogeneity and policy polarization increase the
hazard of transposition of EU directives several weeks after the deadline has
expired. Likewise, Commission disagreement with a directive has a negative
effect on the hazard rate of transposition by member states as time has passed
after the deadline (only the time-dependent effect is significant). The effects
reported in Table 3 do not allow for a precise interpretation of the time-
dependent coefficients, and we will elaborate on this later.
The discretion ratio negatively affects timeliness in transposition. More
precisely, with a one-unit increase in the discretion ratio the hazard of
transposing the directives decreases by 2.3% (i.e. 1 – exp(–0.0236423)
= 1 – 0.97663499). The time-dependent coefficient of discretion is positive
but not significant. In addition, the distance between a member state and the
Commission has a significant effect on the timeliness of transposition of EU
directives. According to the analyses, when the Commission disagrees with
the policy position of a member state, the latter is 0.4% more likely to trans-
pose the EU laws on time. A member state’s incentive for deviation does not
affect the hazard of transposition.
The Enforcement Model in Table 3 includes the behaviour of the
Commission. We predicted in Hypothesis 2 that (a) member states speed up
transposition after the instigation of infringement procedures, and (b) the
positive effect of conflict on the hazard of transposition is mediated by the
instigation of an infringement procedure (i.e. a letter of formal notice). Thus,
we expect that including the effect of a letter of formal notice in the analysis
should at least partly explain the effect of conflict in the Council on delays in
transposition.
Because the instigation of a formal notice is a time-varying covariate, it
addresses the question of whether the hazard of transposition is higher before
or after a member state has received a letter of formal notice. The results in
the Enforcement Model show that letters of formal notice initially have a
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 4 9
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negative effect on the hazard of transposition by member states. This finding
is not surprising, since formal letters are mostly sent to member states after
the deadline has expired and are largely the result of non-notification by
national authorities about the undertaken transposition measures. For the
purposes of this study, it is more interesting to find out how this effect changes
over time. The analysis shows that, as expected, the initially negative effect
of infringement procedures on the hazard of transposition decreases over
time. It appears that member states speed up the transposition process after
receiving a letter of formal notice. Later in this section we will return to
discussing the precise changes in the coefficient.
Hypothesis 2b stated that the instigation of infringement procedures by
the Commission should at least partly explain the effect of conflict on delays
in transposition. In comparison with the Preference Model, both polarization
and heterogeneity have smaller coefficients in the Enforcement Model.
However, the time-dependent effects are still highly significant. Thus, we
need to estimate how the conflict coefficients change over time once we
control for the behaviour of the Commission. We will discuss this issue in the
subsequent section.
In the Full Model we test the conditions under which the Commission
will be most effective in monitoring and managing compliance. In 
Hypothesis 3 we predicted that the effect of conflict on delays in trans-
position should be weaker for policies that are further away from the
Commission’s policy preferences. Thus, we add an interaction between the
conflict indicators and the Commission’s disagreement with a directive.
However, Table 3 shows that the interaction is negative but not significant.
Therefore, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that the positive effect of conflict in the
Council on the hazard rate of transposition should be weaker for policies that
grant more discretion to member states. The analysis in the Full Model shows
that this prediction is supported for the time-dependent interaction effects of
both conflict indicators.
Interpretation of time-dependent effects
The results in Table 3 give only a general idea of the effects of the indepen-
dent variables on delays in the transposition of EU directives. The interpret-
ation of the variables with significant time-dependent effects is not
straightforward, since the impact of these variables on the hazard rate is now
a combination of their time-constant and time-varying coefficients (Golub and
Steunenberg, 2007: 556). A more precise interpretation of these coefficients
would require the calculation of the magnitude of the combined effects at
European Union Politics 10(1)5 2
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different time points (in this case: weeks after the deadline). We could 
easily do that on the basis of the estimates in Table 3. However, a simple re-
estimation of the combined effects could still be misleading, since it does not
take into account the standard errors of the combined coefficients.8
In Table 4 we do take into consideration the standard errors of the co-
efficients and show how the impact of our variables changes over time. For
reasons of space, in the Full Model we present the results only for the model
with polarization as a conflict indicator; the same conclusions apply for the
effect of heterogeneity.
Table 4 shows that, in all three models, the positive effect of conflict 
(i.e. polarization) increases over time. Although the effect is not significant in
the first weeks after the deadline has expired, it suddenly turns significant
after the eighth week and increases in magnitude from that period on. More
precisely, in the Preference Model 12 weeks after the deadline, a one-unit
increase in the level of conflict in the Council increases the hazard of 
transposition by 7.3% (exp(0.0709144) – 1 = 1.073489331 – 1). In one year 
(52 weeks) the hazard in transposition is already 12.8% (exp(0.1200239)
– 1 = 1.127523799 – 1) owing to an increase in polarization, and this percent-
age increases with the passage of time. Thus, Hypothesis 1 predicts that
conflict in the Council speeds up the transposition of EU directives, but this
happens only several weeks after the deadline has expired. Thus, according
to our interpretation, the signal of conflict to the Commission becomes
relevant for enforcement and management only after an initial period of time.
This could be explained by the existence of initial thresholds to the
Commission (i.e. minimal costs) before enforcement and management
become active.
In Table 4 we see that, once we control for the effect of letters of formal
notice in the Enforcement Model, the polarization coefficient turns significant
only 35 weeks after the deadline has expired. At this time the hazard rate 
of transposition is 11.3% in the Preference Model (exp(0.1067583) – 1 =
1.112665291 – 1), but only 6.6% in the Enforcement Model (exp(0.0639458) –
1 = 1.066034618 – 1). However, the polarization coefficient is positive and
highly significant in subsequent weeks. In addition, the effect of a formal
notice is also not significant in the first 35 weeks after the deadline has
expired. Based on these observations we do not find support for Hypothesis
2b that the positive effect of conflict on transposition time is mediated by the
instigation of infringement procedures by the Commission. The same holds
for the effect of polarization in the Full Model.
Table 3 shows that instigating a letter of formal notice had a time-
dependent effect on member states’ transposition performance. Table 4
reports how this effect changes over time. The estimations show that letters
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 5 3
 at University of Groningen on January 19, 2011eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 at University of Groningen on January 19, 2011eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
of formal notice do not affect member states’ transposition performance in
the first weeks after the deadline has expired. However, 35 weeks after the
deadline the hazard of transposition is 2.13 times higher for member states
that have been officially warned by the Commission than for those without
formal notifications until this week.9 Based on these results, we find support
for Hypothesis 2a. However, from Table 4 we can conclude that the effect of
a formal notice increases as time passes. This result suggests the operation of
additional factors, such as the decision of the Commission to continue the
infringement procedures against member states.
The discretion ratio weakens the positive effect of conflict on the hazard
of transposition over time, as can be seen in Table 3. The results reported in
Table 4 generally support this finding. The negative effect of the interaction
term turns significant after the deadline has expired. 12 weeks after the
deadline has passed the positive effect of polarization on the hazard of trans-
position decreases by 0.5% if directives grant more discretionary authority to
member states. Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported based on the analysis of time-
dependent effects.
Finally, Table 4 offers support that the negative effect of the Commission’s
disagreement with a directive on the hazard of transposition increases over
time. In the Preference Model, the effect turns significant again in the 35th
week after the deadline. In this period, a unit increase in the Commission’s
disagreement with a directive decreases the hazard ratio of transposition by
1.6%. In all models the effect becomes stronger as time passes. One interpret-
ation of this result is that the Commission is impartial in enforcing com-
pliance before the deadline has expired. However, when member states
continue disobeying the EU directives, the Commission starts to discriminate
between more preferred and less preferred policies. A different interpretation
of this result is that, as time passes, member states learn that they can get
away with further delaying transposition of directives with which the
Commission does not agree.
Why frailty models?
All three models show a significant shared frailty factor, implying that there
is a dependency in the observations based on common unobserved directive-
level characteristics. Table 5 shows the estimates of the time-dependent effects
in the Full Model if the shared frailty factor is excluded from the analysis.
The most important difference from the results in Table 4 pertains to the
effect of conflict. More precisely, the polarization coefficient is not significant
once we control for the effect of formal notice, which contradicts the results
in Table 4. In addition, if we disregard the dependency in the observations,
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council 5 5
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letters of formal notice start having a significant effect much earlier. The
results are similar, even if we simply adjust the standard errors for cluster-
ing. However, shared frailty models are more appropriate for accounting for
the dependency in the observations than standard clustering techniques, since
the former directly model the correlation in the transposition times of member
states. Unlike standard techniques (such as adjusting the standard errors), the
shared frailty factor explains the dependence in the sense that, had we known
the frailty, the events would be independent (Wienke, 2003: 2).
In sum, quantitative studies on EU implementation should account for
the dependency of the observations that emerges when several member 
states implement the same directives. Failing to do so might lead to faulty
inferences about the effects of a few or more of the independent variables.
Conclusion and discussion
This study has contributed in four different ways to the existing literature on
the transposition of EU legislation. First, we introduced conflict among
member states in the Council of the EU as a factor affecting delays in trans-
position. Based on theories of the enforcement and management of EU law,
we predicted that conflict speeds up the transposition process of EU direc-
tives. Second, on the basis of data on the policy positions of member states,
we were able to construct two measures of preference-based conflict: hetero-
geneity and policy polarization. Third, we accounted for the multilevel struc-
ture of the transposition process by controlling for shared frailty in the data
analysis on the transposition times of member states. Finally, we controlled
for time-dependent effects in our analysis and arrived at precise estimates for
the changes over time.
The first and most important result of our study is that preference-based
conflict in the Council indeed affects delays in transposition. Both hetero-
geneity and polarization have significant positive effects on the transposition
performance of member states – even after controlling for member states’
incentives for deviation, the discretion ratio, formal notice or other un-
observed characteristics of the directives accounted by the shared frailty
factor. We also found that conflict starts affecting transposition a couple of
months after the deadline, with an increasing effect over time.
The finding that conflict in the Council leads to shorter delays in the trans-
position of EU directives is in accordance with arguments about the import-
ance of enforcement and management for the implementation of EU
legislation (Tallberg, 2003). In this study we tried to account for the
Commission’s monitoring intensity by controlling for the instigation of formal
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letters by the Commission against member states. We found that member
states are more likely to transpose EU directives after receiving a letter of
formal notice. However, we did not find support for the prediction that
infringement procedures mediate the positive effect of conflict on trans-
position time. Thus, if the effect of conflict could be explained by the
Commission’s activities to solve compliance problems, discussions between
member states and the Commission must operate at a more informal level
than is captured by infringement procedures. We also found that the positive
effect of conflict on transposition decreases over time, the more discretion is
granted to member states at the implementation stage. One interpretation of
this finding is that the Commission is not always capable of responding
effectively to signals of potential non-complaint behaviour by member states,
especially if directives grant high discretion to member states.
The second important result of this study concerns the significant time-
dependent effects in our analysis. We observed that the proportionality
assumption is not met for a number of our independent variables, indicating
that their effects on transposition change over time. Indeed, although the
analyses showed non-significant time-constant effects, these effects turned
out to be highly significant over time. Thus, the results of this study raise
important theoretical questions regarding the dynamics of independent
effects. More precisely, we need specific causal theories that explain how
effects change over time and which mechanisms are responsible for trigger-
ing these changes (König, 2008).
Finally, we showed that the directive-level shared frailty factor has a
significant variance for all analyses. The significant frailty factor at the direc-
tive level is in line with arguments from policy analysis and the implemen-
tation literature that cost implications vary significantly across policies (Lowi,
1964). For instance, our analyses show that there are additional factors at the
level of the directive, not tested in the present study, that would further
account for the transposition performance of member states. The aim of this
study was not to find all possible directive-level characteristics that influence
transposition, and future research on member states’ transposition perform-
ance could further explore variables at the directive level.
Owing to some data limitations, our results must be put in a proper
perspective. Although we controlled for the effect of infringement procedures,
we could not take full account of other more appropriate measures of the
enforcement and management of EU legislation, such as informal dialogues
between the Commission and member states regarding the transposition 
of EU directives. It is a task for future research to find more adequate
operationalizations for monitoring and managing compliance. Another
limitation is that the dependent variable in this study captures delays only
European Union Politics 10(1)5 8
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until the first transposition measure adopted by a member state. A more
sophisticated operationalization of the dependent variable would be to
measure delays until the first ‘correct’ measure of transposition (Falkner 
et al., 2005). However, information on the correct transposition measures of
15 member states for 23 directives would require intensive and time-
consuming data collection, which is beyond the scope of a single article. It is
a challenge for future research to extend the study of transposition with data
on actual deviations and performance of member states.
The dataset, do-file, and additional tables for the empirical analysis in this article
can be found at http://eup.sagepub.com/supplemental/
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1 However, see Héritier et al. (1996) and Knill (2001), who derive the opposite
prediction that more discretion leads to more timely transposition.
2 The original sample in the study by Thomson et al. (2007) contained infor-
mation on 24 directives. We excluded one directive from our analysis, because
it contained only one issue, on which member states all took the same policy
position.
3 Internet search terms included the directive’s number, title and key-words
for content.
4 Thus, the findings of this study refer to the beginning of the transposition
process rather than the completed transposition by member states.
5 Esteban and Ray (1994) developed the following polarization measure and
applied it to income distributions: P(π, x) = K nid = 1
n
jd = 1 πid
1 + α πjd|xid – xjd|,
where K is a scaling parameter, K > 0; α is a polarization sensitivity para-
meter: 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.6.
6 We performed the test by comparing the hazard rates of the country dummies
with the Netherlands (reference category). This is the country with the
shortest average delay in transposition.
7 In the current analyses, interacting the variables with ln(time) is better than
interacting them with ‘time’, since the former better fits the data. In addition,
most treatments of non-proportional effects apply ln(time) as a function of
survival time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001: 978). Once these interactions
are included, the proportionality assumption is no longer violated.
8 See Golub and Steunenberg (2007) for an elaborate discussion of the interpret-
ation of time-dependent effects in EU decision-making.
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9 In the enforcement model, the hazard ratio of letters of formal notice 35 weeks
after the deadline is equal to exp(0.757), which is approximately 2.13.
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